Objectives: The Spanish Government has strengthened tobacco control policies since 2005, including changes in tobacco taxes. Because these changes have targeted cigarettes mainly, the tobacco industry has marketed cheaper alternative tobacco products, offering smokers the possibility to down-trade. This paper traces the evolution of patterns of demand for cigarettes and other tobacco products in Spain over the period 2005-2011 in order to assess the impact of such tax loopholes.
INTRODUCTION
Spain has gone a long way in applying tobacco control policies over the last 5 years. A complete ban on advertising and sponsorship and a smoking ban at workplaces other than bars and restaurants in 2006 [1] were followed by several tax reforms and an extension of the ban to bars and restaurants at the start of 2011 [2] . While some studies have addressed the effects of the first set of clean air measures [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , less attention has been paid to the concommitant fiscal changes and the transformations of the tobacco market that they set in motion.
Within the boundaries of the European tobacco tax Directives, which require a mixed excise system comprising both specific and ad valorem taxes, Spain had traditionally relied on ad valorem taxes (a percentage tax based on the monetary value of the product) in detriment of specific taxes (fixed taxes based on the quantity of the product).
This aimed to protect cheap domestic brands, which under a predominantly ad valorem system can be marketed at a discount, against foreign premium brands. The complete advertising and sponsorship ban in 2006 (a previous ban affecting only public media was passed in 1988) changed the long sustained status quo by reducing competition between tobacco suppliers to the price dimension. This triggered the flooding of the cigarette market with discount brands, to which suppliers of premium brands such as Altria (Phillip Morris) responded by asking for the application of a minimum tax per quantity and engaging in a price war as a way to put pressure on the government [9] Table 1 ). However, other tobacco products (cigars and cigarillos, pipe tobacco and fine-cut tobacco used to hand roll cigarettes) remained taxed on an ad valorem basis With a view to evaluating the public health implications of the tax policies described above, we analyse the tobacco market in Spain over the period 2005-2011. We focus on the cost of the various tobacco products and on the shifting patterns of tobacco demand to identify loopholes that have hampered the public health effectiveness of tobacco taxation. Since other EU countries are also required to implement tax structures and levels that comply with EU tobacco tax directives, we are able to draw implications of both domestic and international interest.
METHOD
We analyse publicly available data on tobacco products sales and prices from
Comisionado para el Mercado de Tabacos [10] , a public agency (formally dependent of the Ministry of Finance) in charge of regulating the supply of tobacco products in Spain.
We use official price indices published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística[11] to account for the effects of inflation. We relate changes in the structure and levels for tobacco taxes, which are published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado [12] , to shifts in the distribution of cigarette prices over time, and to the evolution of the relative prices and the market shares of the four main tobacco products in the Spanish market: cigarettes, cigars and cigarillos (data for which are available only as a composite category), finecut tobacco and pipe tobacco. We abstract from issues related to illegal tobacco products on the basis of recent evidence [13] showing that the share of counterfeit and contraband cigarettes in the Spanish market has remained stable at 2.4%-2.5% between 2006 and 2010. This suggests that the tax changes described in the paper have not had an impact on the size of the illegal market.
RESULTS

Cost of cigarettes
Since the reforms described above sought to put an end to the proliferation of cheap cigarettes, we first examine the evolution of the distribution of cigarette prices in real terms (at 2011 constant prices). It is important to stress that the success of the introduction of a minimum tax has to be gauged by its effect on the lower end of the price distribution, so looking at average or median prices is frequently not informative enough. 
Changes in the relative prices of tobacco products
As mentioned earlier, the 2006 tax reform only applied to manufactured cigarettes. This granted tobacco suppliers the possibility of supplying other tobacco products at low prices. Such a response from the tobacco industry could have been expected since it is well known that downtrading from cigarettes to other tobacco products when taxes on the former are hiked has occurred elsewhere [14] . to examine the absolute differences in prices across the products. Here we focus on the three products that can be easily compared in terms of "packs of 20 cigarette equivalents". We assume that one hand rolled cigarette takes 0.7 grams [15] and that, only for the purposes of this comparison, one cigar or cigarillo is equivalent to one cigarette. Since no obvious conversion assumption is available for pipe tobacco, we leave it out of the comparison.
As we show in Figure 3 , throughout the study period the most expensive product category is cigars and cigarillos whereas the cheapest is fine-cut tobacco for hand-rolled cigarettes. There is a remarkable gap between manufactured cigarettes and hand-rolled cigarettes, the latter costing about 50% less than the former. This gap remains unaltered even after the minimum quantity tax on fine cut tobacco introduced in 2009. In fact, Figure 3 shows that this tax did not prompt the equalisation of the cost of manufactured and hand-rolled cigarettes. On the contrary, the gap between cigarettes and cigars and cigarillos nearly closed towards the end of the study period. 
Changes in the patterns of demand for tobacco products
While cigarettes (representing 91.1% of sales) take by far the largest share of the market, the share of fine cut tobacco has more than trebled (from 1.6% to 5.1% of sales) since 2005 (Figure 4 ). The share of cigars and cigarillos has slightly decreased (from 4.1% to 3.3% of sales), and that of pipe tobacco has remained marginal (at less than 0.5% of sales). The increase in the share of fine cut tobacco is mirrored by a drop in the share of cigarettes, clear to what extent these reforms were influenced by the lobbying of firms such as Altria [9] , which have been reported to promote the application of fully specific tax structures in other European markets in order to benefit their product portfolio [16] . In any case, a better conceived tax package would have avoided an important loophole that the tobacco industry has subsequently been able to exploit. Fine-cut tobacco bore no minimum tax on quantity until 2009, and the level of such tax has not sufficed to close the price gap between manufactured and hand rolled cigarettes up to date. As a result the market share of fine-cut tobacco has increased and now surpasses 5% of sales, and it is expected to grow further. The availability of a cheap alternative over a period when cigarettes were becoming dearer may have deterred price sensitive smokers from quitting. In fact, smoking prevalence in adults has barely changed between 2006
(26.4%) [17] and 2009 (26.2%) [18] , the latest year for which comparable data are available. A clear policy recommendation emerges from these facts: the tax burden between cigarettes and fine-cut tobacco should not create an incentive towards downtrading from manufactured to hand-rolled cigarettes. On the assumption that rolling one cigarette takes 0.7 grams, the minimum tax on fine-cut tobacco should be increased to 167€ per kilogram (but equivalency rates as low as 0.45 grams per cigarette have been reported in some studies [19] so this figure of 167 € per kilogram must be interpreted as a lower bound on the necessary adjustment). Otherwise, the effects on the propensity to quit smoking (or to refrain from starting to smoke) of any cigarette tax increase will be diluted as price sensitive consumers take up hand-rolled cigarettes.
With the appropriate adjustments in levels, this recommendation can be extended to all the EU member states, since the price gap in favour of fine-cut tobacco is pervasive across the region.This first loophole is to a great extent a result of having applied an In conclusion, tax policies in Spain and EU member states should aim to equalise the cost of consuming tobacco across different products. Otherwise the tobacco industry can exploit the resulting tax loopholes to market cheap alternatives. This requires all products to bear a minimum tax on quantity, with levels adjusted in order to reflect the equivalence between different forms of consumption.
WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS
This paper identifies important loopholes in the taxation of cigarette products and illustrates their consequences for the Spanish tobacco market. The loopholes originate from applying a minimum tax on quantity only on cigarettes rather than than on all tobacco products. It shows that these loopholes have permitted the marketing of cheap alternatives to cigarettes and proposes corrective measures.
